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Abstract
In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these
agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of
recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial
agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group
agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of granting recognition in
this manner. The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the condi-tions of
agency in light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as
having similar rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial
agents, they are not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights,
or at least that is what the historical record suggests if we look, for example, at what it took for
corporations to gain legal status in the law as group agents entitled to rights and, consequently,
as entities subject to responsibilities. This is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman
agent, and just as a group agent can be described as non-human, so can an artificial agent.
Therefore, if these two kinds of nonhuman agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in
relevant ways, the agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other—this despite the fact
that neither is human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent
proper, and hence as a bearer of rights.
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Introduction
In this paper, I discuss whether in a society where the use of artificial agents is pervasive, these
agents should be recognized as having rights like those we accord to group agents. This kind of
recognition I understand to be at once social and legal, and I argue that in order for an artificial
agent to be so recognized, it will need to meet the same basic conditions in light of which group
agents are granted such recognition. I then explore the implications of grant-ing recognition in
this manner.
The thesis I will be defending is that artificial agents that do meet the conditions of agency in
light of which we ascribe rights to group agents should thereby be recognized as hav-ing similar
rights. The reason for bringing group agents into the picture is that, like artificial agents, they are
not self-evidently agents of the sort to which we would naturally ascribe rights, such as human
beings for instance. A group agent is an example of agency ascribed to a nonhuman agent, and
just as a group agent can be described as nonhuman, so can an artificial agent. Therefore, if these
two kinds of non-human agents can be shown to be sufficiently similar in relevant ways, the
agency ascribed to one can also be ascribed to the other—this despite the fact that neither is
human, a major impediment when it comes to recognizing an entity as an agent proper, and
hence as a bearer of rights.
As just mentioned, the argument for recognizing artifi-cial agents as having rights will depend
on their meeting the conditions of agency by virtue of which group agents are themselves so
recognized. We will therefore have to spell out a conception of agency stating what those
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conditions of agency are. In so doing I will be taking a two-
pronged strategy: On the one hand, I will block out a
conception of agency on which an agent is any entity that is
both rational and interactive, meaning that it has a capacity
to reason rationally (in a way shortly to be defined) and can
interact intelligently with other agents (in a way that will
also be explained); on the other hand, I will show that from
this conception of agency as competence we can derive two
attributes of agency—namely, responsibility and person-
hood—that we can ascribe to agents capable of engaging
rationally and interactively with other agents.
So what I ultimately want to say is that if an artificial agent
can be described as (i) rational and (ii) interactive, then we
can ascribe (iii) responsibility and (iv) personhood to it, and
consequently we can recognize it as having rights based on
those capacities and attributes: four conditions of agency
satisfying which an artificial agent can be grouped among
other agents having similar rights. And since in so recog-
nizing artificial agents as agents proper we have to under-
stand them as acting in an environment shaped by social and
legal rules, I will finally be discussing what this may entail
for the way our relation to them ought to be framed.
But before we start, I would like to briefly introduce the
idea of rights as they will be used in this paper. I will not enter
here into the discussion of different conceptions and theories
of rights: except to clarify two premises from which I will be
proceeding. The first one is that I am taking the view that
whatever rights we should think it reasonable to ascribe to
artificial agents, these rights will have to be specifically
tailored to the features and abilities these agents are going to
have (on what I will be describing as the competence
approach). And the second premise will be a working defi-
nition of rights as ‘‘entitlements which is incumbent upon
others to acknowledge and respect’’ (Jones 1994, 1). This
notion of rights picks up Hohfeld’s (1917) idea that a right
is made up of claims, privileges, powers and immunities1 
and that with such rights come specific sets of correlative
duties and responsibilities. Thus, for example, if we grant an
agent a right to form a contract, we should also encumber
that agent with a duty to perform the same contract.
Having briefly shed the light on the idea of rights that I
argue artificial agents could be subject to, I will now move
to the first condition of agency, namely rational agency and
explore how artificial agents satisfy it.
First condition of agency: rational agency
I premise this discussion by noting that a rational agent is
one that can act rationally. That is, an agent is an entity that
acts in an environment, so the kind of rationality we are
interested in is the kind we can ascribe to it by looking at
what it does in that environment.
In order to introduce a concept of rational agency, I will
rely on what List and Pettit (2011, 19ff.) call a ‘‘basic
account of agency,’’ on which an agent is anything that can
(a) sense the way things are in its environment (through its
representational states), (b) know the way that environment
should be (through its motivational states), and (c) proceed
to act in the same environment so as to fill that gap between
what is the case and what ought to be the case. On this
basic account, then, an agent has three sorts of features:
(a) an ability to represent the environment such as it is
(through its representational states); (b) an idea of how it
wants the environment to be (through its motivational
states); and (c) an ability to process those states so as to
bring about the required changes. List and Pettit (ibid., 20)
summarize that threefold idea by saying that something is
an agent if it ‘‘has representational states, motivational
states, and a capacity to process them and to act on that
basis.’’
It follows from the foregoing definition of rational
agency that if something has representational states and
motivational states but processes them in a way that cannot
make rational sense to us, then that thing cannot count as
an agent. For example, if a thermostat has a representa-
tional state corresponding to a temperature of 15 C (cur-
rent temperature) and a motivational state corresponding to
25 C (set temperature), but processes those two states in 
such a way as to set the temperature at 10 C, then we 
cannot take it to be a rational agent (assuming the ther-
mostat is not broken and that it is designed to bring the
temperature to the level at which it is set). The same can be
said to apply to an artificial agent: As long as something
can have representations and motivations through which it
acts in its environment, and it can act so as to realize those
motivations in light of its representations, then that thing
counts as an agent in this basic sense.2
In order to make sense of this idea that an agent can be
viewed as rational and intentional even without ascribing a
rational thought process to it or a set of intentions, we need
1 In each of these specifications, a right gives one a normative ability 2 A caveat before we proceed is that the thermostat example just
introduced should not be taken to mean that an artificial device is
rational just because it correctly executes the instructions it is
designed to execute. Nor should the motivational states we attribute to
it be taken to mean that it somehow ‘‘wants’’ or ‘‘intends’’ to do what
it does. The example is rather intended to illustrate that we can
explain an agent’s actions as if it were rational and intentional,
without saying that it is a rational agent driven by actual intentions.
to do or not do something: This can be the ability to demand
something from someone (rights as claims), or the freedom to do
something that is not prohibited (rights as privileges), or the ability to
modify a legal situation (rights as powers) or not be subject to the
powers of others (rights as immunities). For a discussion, see Hohfeld
1917 and Jones 1994.
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to bring in Daniel Dennett and point out that we are looking
at agents not from the physical stance of the natural sci-
ences but from what he has famously called the intentional
stance, the ‘‘strategy of interpreting the behavior of an
entity (person, animal, artifact, whatever) by treating it as if
it were a rational agent who governed its ‘choice’ of ‘ac-
tion’ by a ‘consideration’ of its ‘beliefs’ and
‘desires’’’ (Dennett 2009, 339). The key to that view is
the ‘‘as if’’ phrase which is used to underscore that we
don’t have to ascribe mental states to agents in order to
describe them as rational or as having beliefs and desires:
We just have to be able to analyze their behavior as
consistent with the way a rational agent would act, to
which end we need not con-sider their mental or physical
states, or rather we can do so as long as it is clear that
these states are introduced as heuristic devices, without
having to look at what actually goes on in the ‘‘minds’’
or ‘‘brains’’ of such agents.
In the same vein, List and Pettit (2011, 29) note that
rationality as previously defined need not be a component of
agency so long as we can interpret the agent as having acted
consistently with some piece of reasoning, and since we are
interpreting what the agent is doing, we need not concern
ourselves with identifying any mental or physical state or
series of states corresponding to such reasoning. We just
need a set of criteria in light of which to judge whether a
given course of action is rational, and to this end List and
Pettit (2011, 24) introduce three standards of rationality
necessary for an entity to qualify as an agent. These are an
ability of the agent to connect its attitudes (its
representational and motivational states) with (a) its envi-
ronment, (b) one another, and (c) the actions by which the
agent intervenes in its environment.
With the previously mentioned caveat that an agent’s
attitudes do not necessarily amount to mental states, List
and Pettit provide a compelling case that group agents can
be said to act rationally when they satisfy these standards of
rationality, and an argument can be made that the same
holds for artificial agents. This is because whatever an
artificial agent does, its action can be judged as either
consistent or inconsistent with a piece of reasoning (or with
the standards in light of which any course of action counts
as rational), and to this end we need not concern ourselves
with the agent’s ‘‘inner workings,’’ that is, with the way in
which an agent arrived at the course of action that we are
interested in judging as rational or otherwise. We can see,
then, that even though group and artificial agents both lack a
conscious mind in the way a human agent can be said to
have one, their action can nonetheless be judged as rational
or otherwise, as if a mind were behind the reasoning that led
to the given outcome in question. We regularly judge group
agents in light of standards of rationality, and there is no
reason why we cannot also hold artificial agents to the same
standards.
Having said that, rationality alone does not account for
the whole of agency: Even if an agent satisfies a set of
accompanying standards of rationality, we cannot yet
consider it an agent for the purpose of attributing rights to it
or holding it accountable, as we do with group agents. A
thermostat may pass a test of rationality, but we certainly
wouldn’t confer rights on it for that reason alone, nor
would we hold it responsible for failing to comply with
such a test. The reason why rationality cannot alone define
an agent worthy of moral consideration (an agent recog-
nized as having rights) is that agents typically do not act in
a vacuum but rather interact with other agents: Their action
unfolds in an environment shaped by the action of other
agents, and the resulting interaction thus turns out to be
essential to agency itself. We should therefore consider the
second component of agency, consisting in an agent’s
ability to interact sensibly with other agents.
Second condition of agency: interactive agency
It was just suggested a moment ago that it is unrealistic to
think of an agent as a lone entity acting in an empty space: I
am therefore going to posit that an agent (i) needs to be
rational and (ii) must necessarily be interactive (no matter
how simple its agency). A rational agent is one whose action
is consistent with some piece of reasoning understood to
make some logical sense (even if the agent is not itself rea-
soning in the sense of making inferences and suchlike); an
interactive agent is one that, by virtue of its action, neces-
sarily interacts with other agents (however minimal or con-
strained such interaction may be). I should note that while the
first condition is a desideratum of agency (in that we want
agents to be rational), the second condition is a matter of fact
of agency, in that an agent is ipso facto interactive in virtue of
its acting in any environment (for any environment is going
to be inhabited by other agents that either act on the agent or
stand affected by its action).
This second condition of agency (its interactivity) can be
illustrated by looking at the way List and Pettit (2008, 75)
characterize group agents , defining them as groups of
networked individuals who (a) understand themselves as
part of a group and (b) act in respect of that group in such a
way that the group can be recognized as rational in much
the same way that an individual can be so recognized. It
may seem obvious that the individuals making up a group
must necessarily somehow interact if they are to be rec-
ognized as forming a group, but the point here is that such
interaction is inescapable, and in turn the group must
inevitably interact with other (individual or group) agents
the moment it does anything as a group.
Now we can turn our attention back to artificial agents
and point out three main features they share with group
3
agents: (1) Both can be understood as rational, or as sat-
isfying some criteria of rationality; (2) both are nonhuman;
and (3) both have some kind of social ability, meaning that
they can interact with one another or with human beings.
This in turn means that artificial agents engage in a variety
of activities, and what all these activities have in common is
that they ‘‘conceptually presuppose the existence of other
agents and various social institutions’’ (Tuomela 1984, 1).
The reason for focusing on what artificial agents have in
common with group agents is that we are already accus-
tomed to seeing the latter as having rights, and if we can
show a strong enough similarity between these two kinds of
agents, we have a reason to recognize the first kind (artificial
agents) as having rights like the ones we ascribe to the latter
kind (group agents).3 It is in particular the second common 
feature that makes this for an interesting comparison: Like
artificial agents, group agents are non-human (they are not
persons per se), and this has histori-cally made it difficult to
recognize them as having rights like the ones we ascribe to
human agents. So if we can show that artificial agents share
with group agents a set of features in virtue of which the
latter are recognized as agents proper, then we should see
that it is inconsistent to recognize such rights for one kind of
agent (group agents) while denying them to another
(artificial agents). And the fact that both are nonhuman can
then be seen to fade into the background as irrelevant to
whether they should be owed such recognition.
The two significant features of agency so far discussed
that artificial agents share with group agents is that both are
rational and both are interactive. So what is it about
interactivity that can make it a feature of agency significant
enough to warrant the conclusion that interactive agents can
be recognized as having rights?
I answer this question by making two observations. The
first is that (i) Whenever any set of agents interact on the
basis of some ‘‘code’’ they execute or some piece of rea-
soning they act on, the action of some agents is going to
affect that of others; (ii) when this mutual effect is sig-
nificant enough, it is going to be either harmful or bene-
ficial to some of the agents involved; (iii) whenever any
harm or good is involved in any interaction between agents,
the question of right and wrong comes up; and (iv)
whenever the question of right and wrong comes up, we can
ask whether someone is rightfully entitled to the good
they benefited from or is responsible for the harm they
suffered. Of course the agent needs to be autonomous in
some way in order for these questions to be asked sensibly
(and I address that question later on in ‘‘Structural differ-
ence’’ section), but for the time being it is enough that we
recognize how these questions can come up and how they
relate to that of rights.
The second observation (which I will be developing at
the end of ‘‘Fourth condition of agency: personhood’’
section) is that when agents interact, they are likely to do so
by playing different roles, and when roles are involved we
can ask what is expected of the agents that fill them and
what those agents need in order to fill those roles properly.
This, too, is essentially a question of rights, and it is in
virtue of the roles ascribable to interactive agents that we
can begin to bring that question into view.
Of course, even when the interaction casts agents in
different roles and affects them in ways that are either good
or bad, we still do not have all the conditions of agency
needed to recognize them as having rights. To this end we
need to introduce the third and fourth conditions of agency,
namely, responsibility itself and personhood. This is what
we will do in ‘‘Third condition of agency: responsibility’’
and ‘‘Fourth condition of agency: personhood’’ sections,
showing how the responsibility and personhood that List
and Pettit ascribe to group agents can also be ascribed to
artificial agents.
Third condition of agency: responsibility
We can now look at List and Pettit’s account of responsi-
bility so as to see how it applies to both group and artificial
agents. Responsibility is described by them in a straight-
forward way as a concept dependent on an underlying
notion of good and bad behaviour (which we are assumed to
have an intuitive grasp of): ‘‘If what was done is something
bad, then the agent is a candidate for blame; if it is
something good, then the agent is a candidate for approval
and praise’’ (List and Pettit 2011, 154).4
List and Pettit go on to specify three conditions for an
agent to be fit to be held responsible (ibid., 158), and in so
doing they complement the idea of good and bad with that
of right and wrong. We can see this in the first condition,
that of normative significance:
(i) Normative significance simply means that the agent is
facing a normative or moral situation, that is, a situation
involving a normatively significant choice or option, or ‘‘the
possibility of doing something good or bad, right or
wrong’’ (ibid.).
3 I should note that the parallel between group agents and artificial
4 This is a standard position on moral responsibility: See Himma
(2009).
agents is not new (see Solum 1992; Singer 2013). List and Pettit
(2011) and Pettit (2007) seem to reject that parallel, since they
consider the agency of a ‘‘bare-bones’’ artificial agent (a very stripped-
down robotic device) in contrast to the full agency of group agents.
But as can be appreciated from the way artificial agents were just
defined, I understand them to comprise a class much more inclusive
than that of robots.
4
The second condition is a capacity for normative judg-
ment, requiring an agent to have an understanding of the
situation just described:
(ii) Agents can be said to have a capacity for normative
judgment if (a) they can single out the features of a situ-
ation that make it moral or normative, and (b) they
understand that what they do in light of a situation so
framed carries moral or normative consequences; that is,
the agent in question understands that different ways of
handling a situation have different outcomes (the agent
may have a concept of harm, for example) and that not all
of these outcomes carry the same weight (it may have a
concept of moral desert or fair distribution, for example),
and it will therefore not treat those outcomes equally, or at
least it will treat them in such a way that we can infer an
understanding of their moral significance on the agent’s
part. For example, the agent understands that there is a
normative problem involved when different people make a
claim on the same resource and that different distributions
of those resources lead to morally or normatively different
outcomes. In this example, an agent can be said to have a
grasp of all three of the normative concepts mentioned
parenthetically: harm, moral desert, and fair distribution. In
other words, the agent recognizes that harm can be done to
someone by not giving them the resources they claim; it
can recognize that they can claim those resources only if
they meet criteria such as need (this would be a way of
modelling moral desert); and it can distribute those
resources accordingly (fair distribution). This means that
even if we use mental or intentional concepts to describe
the behaviour of agents that lack any mental or intentional
states properly so called, we can analyze their behaviour as
consistent with that of agents that do have such states and
that use them as a basis on which to make normative
judgments.5
(iii) The third condition is the control requirement,
meaning that the agent must be able to exercise control
over the options available: There is no moral responsibility
involved in the face of a situation we can do nothing about.
This is a fairly intuitive idea and seems plausible at face
value, but it does run into some difficulties when it comes
to spelling out exactly what it means to ‘‘control’’ your
options, at least for a human agent: It may well be that we
are indeed in control of a situation when the choice is
presented to us in the context of a moral problem to be 
solved in the abstract—are you going to ‘‘sacrifice one 
person’s life in order to save several other lives’’?—but 
then we may no longer feel in control if we are the person 
who is actually doing the sacrificing, because our emotions 
will get in the way and our moral judgment will change 
accordingly (Greene et al. 2009, 364). And, generally, 
control is not an all-or-nothing affair, as if every morally 
significant situation we are faced with is one whose out-
comes we either control or do not control. So this third 
condition needs to be taken with a grain of salt, and each 
case will accordingly have to be judged on its own merits.
The three conditions of moral responsibility can be 
summarized in the statement that you can’t be held respon-
sible for some state of affairs unless (i) that state of affairs is 
the outcome of a choice that can bring harm or loss to 
yourself or to other people, (ii) you understand what the 
implications of that choice are, and (iii) you actually had an 
opportunity to make that choice—but a couple of more 
points need to be mentioned in that regard before we proceed.
The first point is that, as noted, List and Pettit (2011) rely 
on an underlying notion of what counts as good and bad or 
as right and wrong behaviour, and it was mentioned 
parenthetically that we are assumed to have an intuitive 
grasp of those two notions, that is, we slip them in as 
unchallenged premises. This is actually a gaping hole in 
List and Pettit’s account of responsibility. But I suspect 
that the reason why we are asked to make those assump-
tions is that the two concepts at hand—the right and the 
good—are so fundamental to moral philosophy and have 
been so widely discussed over the course of history that 
any satisfactory account of them would take us on a long 
detour from which it would be difficult to come back, and 
even if we did firm up a thoroughly reasoned out theory of 
the good and the right, chances are that when it comes 
down to the nitty–gritty of practical judgment in specific 
cases (everything from broad policy decisions to what we 
should have for lunch), different people (or agents) rea-
soning from the same theory will arrive at different con-
clusions about what ought to be done. So it’s much simpler 
to assume that we already know what’s good and what’s 
right in any given instance, without having to justify those 
judgments. And even though this is certainly a shortcut, it 
doesn’t mean that we cannot justify the judgments we 
make: We can, and we probably also should do so when-
ever the issue at hand is not so simple as how to divide a 
pie so that we each get our fair share, that is, whenever 
disagreement can arise about what is morally good or 
right.6
5 I should point out, as previously suggested, that while a capacity for
normative judgment is an essential condition subject to which 
responsibility can be ascribed to an agent, we also have to look at the 
roles agents play in the environment in which they interact, for this is 
essential in figuring out the kinds of responsibilities that can be 
ascribed to them and the consequences that should follow as a result of 
the agent failing to fulfil those responsibilities. The question of roles is 
discussed at the end of ‘‘Fourth condition of agency: personhood’’ 
section.
6 For other criticisms about the fitness to be held responsible, see
Tuomela (2011).
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The second point is that, as much as these three all-
encompassing conditions may seem broad and abstract, 
they are reflected in the standards that lawyers and judges 
use to resolve the very practical cases that arise in tort 
liability. Consider the conditions that must be satisfied in a 
suit in order to prove that someone was negligent (and so is 
to be held responsible for some state of affairs). The person 
bringing the suit (the plaintiff) ‘‘must show four things:
(a) there was a duty imposed on the defendant in favor of 
the plaintiff, (b) the defendant breached (violated) that 
duty, (c) the duty was the proximate (natural and foresee-
able) cause of the harm, and (d) plaintiff suffered dam-
ages’’ (Emerson and Hardwicke 1997, 376). Take out any 
one of List and Pettit’s three conditions of responsibility 
and you can no longer account for the legal elements of 
negligence. So, if we try to do away with List and Pettit’s 
first condition (normative significance), we end up looking 
at a state of affairs that was going to happen anyway (there 
was no choice involved and so no choice can be pointed out 
as the source of the harm caused): This means that we 
cannot even begin to entertain the legal idea of (a) a duty 
(which presupposes a course of action that must be taken 
when others are possible, and so a choice) or the idea of 
(d) damages (which explicitly means that harm was done to 
somebody, the plaintiff). Likewise, if we try to do away 
with List and Pettit’s second condition (a capacity for 
normative judgments), then we cannot make sense of the 
legal idea of (b) a breach of duty, for this idea presupposes 
an ability to understand what is at stake when we act in 
such a way as to violate an expectation (which in turn 
presupposes a choice). And, finally, if we try to do away 
with the third condition (the control requirement), we end 
up looking at a situation that was not caused through any 
agency, and so we cannot make sense of the legal idea of 
(c) proximate cause, which presupposes that someone can 
do something (i.e., can control the situation) in such a way 
as to bring about the harm in question.7 This is not to say 
that the doctrines the law has evolved are thereby justified 
simply because they are the law, but it does suggest that 
List and Pettit’s conditions of responsibility model the 
presuppositions of responsibility, that is, the factors that 
need to be taken into account before we can even begin to 
ascribe responsibility to an agent.
List and Pettit explain how all three conditions can be 
met by group agents. We will not be entering into this 
explanation here, but I should point out that implicit in 
these conditions of moral responsibility is the assumption 
that if an agent is to be held morally responsible, it must be
in a position where it can make choices, for that is what it 
means to act in a morally significant situation. So, built into 
this account of an agent’s responsibility is the standard 
view that this concept is closely bound up with that of 
freedom: An agent can be said to be responsible only to the 
extent to which it is free, ‘‘such that no matter what you do, 
you will fully deserve blame should the action be bad, and 
fully deserve praise should the action be good’’ (Pettit 2001, 
12). This standard view of moral accountability is 
essentially the aforementioned Kantian principle that ought 
implies can, coupled with the corollary that can implies 
freedom. I mention this because, on the one hand, the 
principle is central to the argument I am making about 
what it means for an agent to be held responsible, but at the 
same time it is not always clear how the freedom required 
of a responsible agent is to be specified: As an abstract 
concept it means that an agent has options in dealing with 
the situation at hand, but as a practical matter these options 
may not be easy for the agent to see or choose. So there is 
often much interpretation that goes into deciding whether 
an agent can be held responsible on this Kantian principle. 
The difficulty involved in applying the principle, however, 
does not warrant the conclusion that we should invalidate 
it.
The argument I will now be making is that the afore-
mentioned requirements for responsibility can also be sat-
isfied by artificial agents, or that there is, in principle, no 
condition of responsibility that group agents can satisfy but 
artificial agents cannot.
The first condition (normative significance) simply 
requires an agent to find itself in a situation to deal with 
which a choice needs to be made that somehow carries 
moral import, and there is no conceivable situation in 
which this might apply to a group agent but not to an 
artificial one. An example might be a military robot oper-
ating in a warzone and chancing upon a child soldier who is 
preparing to shoot at civilians: Any choice the robot will 
make in such a situation—and in particular the decision 
whether or not to fire at or otherwise disable the child 
soldier so as to save civilian lives—will have moral ram-
ifications, regardless of whether any moral considerations 
factor into the robot’s decision-making. Of course, this is 
not a morally straightforward choice, because there are 
valid reasons on both sides of the argument, but it is 
nonetheless a morally significant choice, and one the arti-
ficial agent cannot escape.
Next we can turn to the second condition for responsi-
bility, the capacity of an agent to form a normative judg-
ment. This is actually a twofold condition in List and 
Pettit’s description, for in the first place an agent must have 
access to the relevant facts or evidence on which a moral 
choice hinges: This is a general problem not distinctive to 
any specific kind of agent (group or otherwise). It is more
7 Another example where List and Pettit’s three conditions of
responsibility find a counterpart in the law is in the legal concept of
force majeure, which excuses a party from responsibility for
nonperformance ascribable to events beyond that party’s control.
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an epistemological problem than an agential one. So we 
can assume that the agent has access to all relevant infor-
mation, and at this point we can focus on the second part of 
this condition, which is that an agent must be able to rec-
ognize information as morally relevant and be able to draw 
moral conclusions from it: as List and Pettit (2011, 158) 
put it, an agent must be able ‘‘to form judgments on nor-
mative propositions’’ expressed in terms of ‘‘it is right that 
X.’’ In the example of the child soldier, a robot agent must 
have a capacity to understand what is morally at stake in 
the situation, deciding which is the lesser of the two evils, 
namely, using deadly force on a child or allowing civilians 
to be targets of the child.
Clearly, this can be a difficult predicament for any 
human, let alone for a group or an artificial agent. List and 
Pettit argue that this ability can be ascribed to group agents 
through the individuals who form the group, but the same 
argument cannot be applied to artificial agents, because in 
this case there are no constituent individual agents through 
which such an ability can be exercised.8 As a practical 
matter, however, we should consider that if robots can learn 
from experience by observing human behaviour, and if the 
beha-viour they are learning from is consistent with 
standards of rightness, then these robots can likewise be said 
to act in a normatively correct way. And even though they 
may not be able to understand what is right about the 
behaviour they are mimicking, there is no inherent feature 
of their internal language or programming that should 
preclude an ability to so reason. So there is much room for 
improvement. And, in addition, some authors claim that 
future artificial agents can be morally superior to us because 
these agents ‘‘would lack an evolutionary past like ours that 
dooms us to a core of bad behaviors’’ (Dietrich 2011, 531).
With that said we can turn to the third condition: Having 
encountered a normatively significant situation (first con-
dition), and having appreciated its moral import and con-
sequently formed a practical judgment about how it ought to 
be solved (second condition), an agent is required to have 
the control needed to act on that judgment. With group 
agents, the problem is how the group can be said to be in 
control of an action when it is the individuals in the group 
who make all the decisions on the group’s behalf and 
materially carry out those decisions. The problem, List and 
Pettit point out (2011, 161), is parallel to a classic problem 
in the philosophy of mind, that of multi-level causality, 
where the question arises: Is it at the neuronal level that 
action is controlled or is it at the mental level, namely, the 
level of an individual’s intentional attitudes? And their 
argument is that, just as the neurons cannot be said to rob 
the individual of causal control over his or her actions, so
the individuals who make up a group cannot be said to rob 
the group of control over its decisions about how to act. A 
similar problem arises in regard to artificial agents, for it can 
be asked whether control over their actions rests with 
designers or with the design itself.9 And here, too, an 
argument can be made that just as our neurons do not rob us 
of the control we can exercise over our actions, so an 
artificial agent’s designers cannot be said to deprive the 
agent of all control over its actions: The agent will still 
maintain some autonomy (a subject I expand on in ‘‘Two 
kinds of autonomy’’ section), and so will continue to 
exercise some control, for otherwise it wouldn’t be rec-
ognized as an agent to begin with.
So, in summary, the three conditions necessary for an 
agent to be held morally responsible can be argued to apply 
to group and artificial agents alike, in that artificial agents 
can (a) find themselves facing a normatively charged sit-
uation, one whose outcomes are morally significant;(b) 
judge the situation in ways that take those normative 
features into account; and (c) exercise a degree of control in 
making decisions on that basis. The condition that is most 
difficult for an artificial agent to meet is clearly (b), since 
artificial agents do not engage in the practical rea-soning 
needed to work through the implications of a nor-matively 
significant situation, but for one thing there is no reason to 
think that they can’t develop such an ability in the future, 
and for another—on the intentional stance previ-ously 
introduced in ‘‘First condition of agency: rational agency’’ 
section—their behaviour can be interpreted as consistent 
with practical reasoning, and may even be pre-dicted by 
attributing practical reasoning to them, without having to 
invoke something like a thinking mind behind that 
reasoning.
We have considered the grounds on which responsibility 
can be ascribed to artificial agents, so let us take up the 
question of their personhood, again drawing a parallel 
between artificial and group agents.
8 This structural difference will be taken up in ‘‘Structural differ-
ence’’ section.
9 I should note here that this parallel between neurons and
individuals, on the one hand, and individuals and groups, on the other, 
is itself up for debate. It would be rejected on an incompatibilist view 
such as hard determinism or metaphysical libertarianism. The former 
would argue that there is no free will in virtue of which an individual 
or group agent might control its actions—for that control is only 
mechanistic (Illes 2005, 45)—such that the question of responsibility 
wouldn’t arise in the first place. The latter, for its part, would grant that 
responsibility is an issue, but only for human beings and only if they 
have ‘‘a freedom to originate action uncaused by prior events and 
influences’’ (ibid.).
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Fourth condition of agency: personhood
Just as we backtracked to a basic concept of agency and a 
broad account of responsibility in making the argument 
that there are grounds on which artificial agents can be held 
responsible for their actions, so a similar strategy can be 
adopted in considering their personhood. To this end I ask 
the simple (albeit philosophically fraught) question, What 
is a person? The question is relevant because, depending on 
how it is answered, we can extract consequences about the 
way we ought to relate to artificial agents as a society, and 
so how we should deal with them in the law. Let us begin 
by noting, in this regard, that a person, according to List 
and Pettit (2011, 173), is essentially what I would call a 
social-relational being, someone with a capacity to func-
tion in a social setting governed by a system of mutual 
expectations. As they put it, a person can ‘‘be party to a 
system of accepted conventions, such as a system of law, 
under which one contracts obligations to others and […] 
derives entitlements from the reciprocal obligations of 
others. In particular, it is to be a knowledgeable and 
competent party to such a system of obligations.’’
This sociality of personhood is an important point I will 
be developing in what follows, but before we get there we 
should clear two methodological errors out of the way as 
we approach the question of how personhood might be 
ascribed to an agent. The first error is essentially an 
application of the naturalistic fallacy, and the idea is that 
we cannot ascribe personhood to an agent just because the 
agent somehow has the makings of a natural person.10 The 
second error consists in taking what List and Pettit (2011, 
170–71) call the intrinsicist view, which as the name 
suggests would have us ascribe personhood on the basis of 
what an agent intrinsically is, by determining the 
‘‘essence’’ of that agent. The problem with the naturalistic 
fallacy is that an agent may resemble a human being and 
yet have none of the features on which basis we would call 
a human being a person (a case in point might be a man-
nequin). The problem with the intrincisist view, on the 
other hand, is that the question of essence is too specula-
tive: It can easily yield abstract principles subject to any 
number of interpretations and unlikely to be of any prac-
tical use.
Once we clear those two errors out of the way, we can 
focus on a third approach in deciding whether an agent has 
personhood. This approach, very much in line with the
discussion so far, is based on what List and Pettit call the 
performative conception of personhood, the idea being that 
in deciding whether or not the entity before us is an agent, 
we should consider not its likeness to a natural person (the 
naturalistic fallacy) or what that agent essentially is (the 
intrincisist view) but what it does or can do within a range 
of possibilities.11 If you’ll recall the definition of an agent 
introduced at the outset on the basic account of agency, an 
agent was someone who can act in the world so as to bring 
about the desired changes, with an emphasis on what an 
agent can do, precisely the emphasis that distinguishes the 
performative account of personhood. Now, next to that 
emphasis we can bring in a new one by focusing not only 
on the ability to act in the world with a view to changing it 
(in accordance with an agent’s motivational states) but also 
on the ability to act in a social world. On a performative 
approach, then, an agent can be considered a person if it 
can act in both of the worlds just mentioned: the physical 
world of actual possibility and the social world of inter-
action, a world framed by rules, principles, and conven-
tions about what may and may not be done and by what is 
required or expected of one (List and Pettit 2011, 174). In 
both respects, an agent qua person is like a human or group 
agent, not in the sense that there is a natural resemblance 
between the two, but in the sense that these agents behave 
in ways that enable them to be part of a system of mutual 
obligations and accepted conventions: This is something 
that nonperson agents cannot do, since they do not have an 
awareness of what is expected of them or of what they can 
expect from others. So the thing that makes an agent a 
person is this capacity to operate within a system of obli-
gations and conventions, and for this reason, as List and 
Pettit argue (ibid.), whatever the agent in question is, if it 
can engage with humans and group agents within a com-
monly established framework of conventions, then it can be 
regarded as a person.
With that view of personhood in place—call it the 
performative-relational view—we can now consider
10 Although it is a fallacy to proceed on a basis of likeness to human
11 Yet another approach to personhood is the interest-based one
offered by Briggs (2012), who takes List and Pettit’s view of 
personhood to mean that ‘‘a person is the sort of thing to which it is 
appropriate to assign conventional rights’’ (Briggs 2012, 289) and thus 
suggests that we look to interests as the basis on which to assign those 
rights, the idea being that it makes no sense to ascribe rights to 
something (say, a rock) if that thing ‘‘cannot benefit from those rights’’ 
and so cannot be said to have an interest in them. This idea that 
something ought to have rights to the extent that it can benefit from 
them calls up the competence approach (because implicit in that idea is 
that of an underlying capacity, or ability, to benefit from the rights in 
question), but at the same time, an interest-based approach would be 
more restrictive in its ascription of rights than would the inter-
relational approach I will be introducing shortly, for if we take 
interests as a basis of ascription, we may not be able to contemplate the 
idea of the environment, for example, as having any interest in 
protection and so as a subject of rights.
beings in ascribing personhood to an agent, there is no denying that 
humans do react differently in their interaction with a robot when the 
robot looks human. As the roboticist Daniel Wilson observes (Singer 
2009, 405), we unconsciously make judgments based on a robot’s 
form and ‘‘care differently about a humanoid robot versus a dog robot 
versus a robot that doesn’t look like anything alive.’’
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whether it can be extended not only to group agents (as List 
and Pettit do) but also to artificial agents. For if we can do 
that, we will be justified in conceiving artificial agents as 
persons in that performative-relational sense. The argument 
for that extension can be made by combining two obser-
vations. The first one is that what the performative-rela-
tional view essentially proposes is a variety of the Turing 
test—for it tests for an intangible quality x by seeing 
whether the entity in question can do y—and the second 
one is that the same basic idea underpins a class of 
approaches (I would accordingly call them functional or 
Turing test approaches) that have been used to test for 
qualities that are either akin to personhood or identical with 
it.12 So the argument, in one long breath, contains three 
premises as follows: If (a) the performative-relational view 
belongs with a broader class of approaches that all rely on 
the same insight to test for an intangible quality x, (b) the 
quality being tested for is either personhood itself or 
something closely associated with it—like consciousness 
or intelligence, such that an entity recognized as having 
one quality or combination of qualities cannot easily be 
said to lack the others in the list (can a conscious, intelli-
gent being really be said to lack personhood?)—and (c) the 
functional approaches in question are testing for this 
quality to see whether it can be ascribed to entities other 
than group agents, then we can use the same approaches as 
support for the thesis that personhood in List and Pettit’s 
performative-relational sense also applies to other kinds of 
agents, and to artificial agents in particular.
I should mention, before we begin, that a similar 
approach has been suggested by Galliott (2015), who 
brings it to bear in dealing with the problem of responsi-
bility in automated warfare. He turns in particular to the 
problem of ‘‘the supposed ‘responsibility gap’—namely, 
the inability to identify an appropriate locus of responsi-
bility’’ (ibid., 211)—and observes that it would not be too 
practical to address this problem from the perspective of 
the ‘‘classical accounts’’ (ibid., 224) of responsibility, with 
their emphasis on ‘‘free will and intentionality’’ (ibid.). 
Instead, we should take a pragmatic or functional approach 
to responsibility, which does not proceed from a concept of 
agency in thinking about responsibility (as List and Pettit 
do) but rather frames the discussion in terms of roles and 
norms. As Galliott notes in that regard, ‘‘both Daniel
Dennett and Peter Strawson have long held that we should
conceive of moral responsibility as less of an individual
duty and more of a role that is actively defined by prag-
matic group norms’’ (ibid.). This means that responsibility
is ascribed not so much by identifying a cast of characters
and asking what they did (‘‘who did what?’’), as by con-
sidering the norms by which they operate, the roles they
play in following those norms, and the underlying ratio-
nales (i.e., what the aims and reasons are behind those
norms and roles), very much in keeping with the perfor-
mative-relational view just outlined, where an agent’s
capacities are conceived as capacities exercised in a social
world governed by norms enabling different agents to
interact without incident. Like List and Pettit’s agency-
centred approach, this functional approach ‘‘has the benefit
of allowing non-human entities, such as complex socio-
technical systems and the corporations that manufacture
them, to be answerable for the harms which they often
cause or contribute to’’ (ibid.; italics added), and like the
functional approaches it fills variable x—the locus of
responsibility in Galliott’s case, the locus of personhood in
our case—not by looking for characters who may fit the
description but by focusing on outcomes:13 Just as Galliott
arrives at responsibility by first asking how a given set of
norms and roles can yield a frictionless social environment
and how we should reframe those norms and roles when
accidents happen revealing that something is not working,
and only then (if need be) looking at who or what was
entrusted with those roles, so we arrive at personhood by
asking what it is that an agent can do in a social environ-
ment, or whether it can perform in a socially congruent and
beneficial manner.
Two differences between group and artificial
agents
So far in this discussion we have considered how a con-
ception of agency, responsibility, and personhood can be
framed in such a way as to apply to group and artificial
agents alike. This was done by abstracting from notions of
agency, responsibility, and personhood that might be
described as anthropocentric in virtue of their using the
human being as the basic reference point for thinking about
these questions. And by framing the discussion in this more
abstract way—that is, by looking at what agents do or can
do, rather than at whether they have a mind like ours or
some other inherently human feature—we have been able
12 Four such approaches are Hubbard (2011) (in which the x variable
is personhood itself), Rothblatt (2014) (consciousness), Dennett 
(2013) (intelligence), and rights (Nussbaum 2006, 2011), and what 
they all have in common is that, in testing for a quality or property x, 
they do not ask us to imagine what it would be like to enter into the 
‘‘mind’’ of the entity we think it might be ascribable to, but only ask 
us to consider whether this entity is functionally or operationally 
capable of acting consistently with what it means to have that quality 
or property.
13 The approach ‘‘allows for the fact that agency develops over time
and shifts the focus to the future appropriate behaviour of complex 
systems, with moral responsibility being more a matter of rational and 
socially efficient policy that is largely outcomes-focused’’ (Galliott 
2015, 224).
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to bring out some features that group and artificial agents 
importantly have in common. But no less important are the 
differences between group and artificial agents, and we will 
focus on two in particular: a structural difference (in 
‘‘Structural difference’’ section), which is that a group agent 
is made up of individual agents, while an artificial agent 
generally is not; and a difference pertaining to the question 
of autonomy (‘‘Two kinds of autonomy’’ section), which in 
a group agent is described by List and Pettit (2011, 76) as a 
supervenient autonomy, whereas in an artificial agent it is a 
conferred but self-reinforcing autonomy.
Structural difference
As previously mentioned, one of the difficulties we face in 
drawing analogies between group and artificial agents is that 
they are structured differently, which is to say that only 
group agents are made up of constituent (group or 
individual) agents, namely, the people who view them-
selves as part of the group. This suggests that no point of 
comparison can properly be established between struc-
turally different entities. If we take a closer look at the 
concept of a group agent, however, we will see that it would 
be a mistake to draw that conclusion.
List and Pettit note that it’s wrong to think of a group 
agent as simply a collection of its members, for if it were we 
could not ascribe agency to it. In their own words, a group 
agent is ‘‘a single entity and not the collection of its 
members,’’ for this entity ‘‘is subject in its own right to the 
constraints of agency’’ (List and Pettit 2011, 194). Another 
way to say this is that a group agent results not from the 
joint action of its members but from their corporate action: 
In joint action, individuals work together toward a common 
goal, whereas in corporate action we start out with a group 
entity, and only when that entity is formed can it act the way 
its creators intended.14 There is a deeper sense, then, in 
which a group agent can be said to form a single entity: 
Although it could not exist without its constituent members 
(which are therefore essential), it is not in these members 
that its agency lies, for this is not an agency that can be 
arrived at by summing up the agencies of all the group’s 
members. And this shows that, while artificial agents may
be structured in a different way than group agents, that 
difference does not stand in the way of our identifying 
relevant analogies between agents corresponding to those 
two descriptions.15
But, as mentioned, there is also a second argument that 
could be mounted in rejecting the idea of a parallel 
between artificial and group agents, in that they have dif-
ferent kinds of autonomy. In the next section, however, I 
will argue that even this argument does not stand up to 
scrutiny.
Two kinds of autonomy
The second argument against the view that group agents 
can suitably illustrate how artificial agents could be rec-
ognized as agents proper proceeds from the case of a 
corporation as a group agent in the law, and from the 
premise that a corporation is a fictitious (legal) person 
whose will is actually the will of its members (of those who 
own or run the corporation). Hence the conclusion that a 
corporation lacks autonomy. List and Pettit (2011) reject 
this view of group agency as fictitious and hence devoid of 
autonomy, and in the rest of this section I explain why and 
contrast their account of a group agent’s autonomy with my 
own account of the autonomy of artificial agents, the latter 
account proceeding from the premise that artificial agents 
do have autonomy, for otherwise we wouldn’t have to 
worry about their status as entities independent of their 
human developers and users or about their status as actors 
in the social world.
There are two different notions at work when we speak 
of autonomy in a group agent and in an artificial agent. 
Both are subject to limitations, as one might expect, so it is 
the way in which those limitations operate that we have to 
consider in fleshing out the two different types of auton-
omy in question.
The autonomy of a group agent is limited by its struc-
ture as an entity that could not exist without its members, 
especially in its operation, in that everything a group agent 
does must necessarily be done through its members: A 
group agent cannot do the things it does unless its members 
act in such a way as to bring about that result, and the 
group agent’s action therefore cannot arise independently 
of that of its members (List and Pettit 2011, 64). And yet it 
does make sense to speak of a group agent as somehow 
acting independently, or as having a ‘‘mind of its own,’’ 
and to explain that insight List and Pettit advance a
14 Interestingly for our purposes, this very same reasoning was
15 Another parallel that can be drawn is between a group agent and a
multi-agent system (MAS), a system composed of interacting 
individual agents (computer systems) acting to achieve a common goal 
(for an introduction to MASs, see Woolridge 2009). This parallel will 
not be addressed here because the artificial agents making up an MAS 
are different from the kinds of agents discussed in this paper.
anticipated by Chief Justice John Marshall in the landmark case
Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (1819), where it was
applied to the concept of a business corporation: ‘‘From the nature of
things, the artificial person called a corporation, must be created,
before it can be capable of taking any thing. When, therefore, a
charter is granted, and it brings the corporation into existence without
any act of the natural persons who compose it, and gives such
corporation any privileges, franchises, or property, the law deems the
corporation to be first brought into existence, and then clothes it with
the granted liberties and property’’ (italics added).
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supervenience thesis: A group agent’s actions and attitudes 
(what the agent ‘‘does’’ and ‘‘thinks’’) supervene on those 
of its members, that is, they emerge on the basis of those 
latter actions and attitudes, and it is the group’s structural 
design that determines how that happens.16 To see this, we 
can take the authors’ example of a democratically orga-
nized group agent versus a tyrannically organized one: 
What the group decides in the first case depends on what a 
majority of its members decide; what it decides in the 
second depends on what the dictator commands, regardless 
of what everyone else in the group thinks. This means that 
two groups may have the same attitude but may arrive at 
that attitude in different ways as a function of the group’s 
procedural organization or structure.
So a group agent’s range of action can be said to depend 
on two factors: on the spectrum afforded by its individual 
members—the spectrum of their attitudes—coupled with 
the way these attitudes are procedurally worked into a final 
outcome, that is, a final or emergent decision or attitude. 
But how does this emergence or supervenience amount to 
something like the group’s autonomy?
The way List and Pettit tackle this problem is by putting 
forward the thesis of a ‘‘non-redundant realism’’ (List and 
Pettit 2011, 76). By this term they mean that group agents 
exist—they are real—and this reality cannot be reduced to 
that of their members: It cannot be ‘‘analyzed away’’ and 
thus collapsed into that of their members, and it is in this 
sense that the autonomy of group agents can be described as 
non-redundant.17 However, it is not an ontological auton-
omy that we are looking at but an epistemological one: A 
group agent’s existence, and hence its autonomy, is not 
something that’s ‘‘out there’’ in the world—group agents do 
not exist as ‘‘hyper-realities’’ (ibid., 75)—so the best we can 
do is work out theories that will show us how their autonomy 
works.18 But we have to be careful here. We saw earlier that 
no group agency could exist without the individual agencies
of the people who make up the group: These people interact
in complex ways so as to enable the group to act as a group
with its own identity, and this suggests that we could
unbundle these interlocking strands by tracing them to the
individual actions and attitudes of the group’s members. But
this is precisely the error List and Pettit want us to avoid,
arguing that if we embrace this methodological stance—a
methodological individualism that would have us observe
the group agent exclusively through the lens of its individual
members—we will be prevented from seeing ‘‘the wood for
the trees’’ (ibid., 76).19
We can see, then, that this epistemological group
autonomy welds together two claims: On the one hand is the
positive claim that by studying agents we can genuinely
advance our knowledge about our social existence as framed
by a complex of nontrivial interactions with our environ-
ment; on the other hand is the negative claim that this
knowledge is not something we can gain just by studying the
way the individual constituents of that social world behave
(while neglecting all other factors). In fact, when it comes to
figuring out the attitudes of group agents as supervenient on
those of its members, we may be tempted to draw a straight
line from one end to the other (from individuals to the group
they form), but the relation may well be more complex than
that, and as List and Pettit point out, there are three sorts of
difficulties to account for that.
First, there is the difficulty of identifying the attitudes of
individual members. Although we know that the group
agent’s attitudes are dependent on those of its individual
members, it may be a challenge to identify and ‘‘count’’
those attitudes. For instance, we may know that the group
agent has adopted an attitude based on what the majority of
its members think, but we may not know how to determine
the makeup of that majority.
A second difficulty arises when the group’s attitudes
depend not on those of its individual members but on the
attitudes that different sets of members take to a complex
of interconnected propositions. In order to overcome a
difficulty of this sort, we would have to know which
propositions count for a given group attitude, which sets of
individual members count more than others, and so on—
which, again, can become a challenge.
The third difficulty comes in when the group agent’s
organizational structure is unclear, as when decisions are
taken by a (nonbinding) straw-vote procedure. In such
cases, the group agent’s attitudes still supervene on those of
its individual members, but it becomes very complicated to
date back the dynamics through which the group agent took
the stance corresponding to those attitudes. In fact, super-
venience in this case becomes bidirectional, since it may be
16 As Tuomela (2011) has pointed out, the authors do not address the
grounds of supervenience—causal, conceptual, or epistemic—and my
own discussion of supervenience suffers form the same defect.
17
There are a number of other theories that take this approach: See 
the table in List and Pettit (2011, 7).
18
This is List and Pettit’s way of striking a middle ground between 
two views of group agency which they term ‘‘emergentist’’ and 
‘‘eliminativist’’: ‘‘Where emergentism makes group agents into hyper-
realities, eliminativism makes them into non-realities’’ (List and Pettit
2011, 75). It is not entirely clear, however, how this middle-of-the-
road view (epistemological autonomy) can be distinguished from the 
emergentist view, since List and Pettit use the same exact language to 
describe both: ‘‘From the emergentist tradition,’’ they note, ‘‘it went
without saying that group agents were agents in their own right, over
and above their members’’ (ibid. 73); compare that with their own 
approach, on which ‘‘we must think of group agents as relatively
autonomous entities—agents in their own right’’ (ibid., 77), thus
defending ‘‘the idea that group agents can be agents over and above
their individual members’’ (ibid., 78).
19 Non-redundant realism is criticized by Sylvan (2012), arguing that
group agents can be seen through the lens of a redundant realism.
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but also the ends themselves. An overview of the literature 
in computer science suggests that an agent can be said to be 
autonomous if it can (i) learn from experience and act (ii) 
over the long course (iii) without the direct control of 
humans or of other agents (Laukyte 2012). This is still a 
bounded autonomy, to be sure—for it is designed into the 
agent, and so is an endowment the agent gets from its (hu-
man) ‘‘makers’’—but it also gives the agent an increasing 
ability to bring its experience to bear on that autonomy so as 
to expand the kinds of ways in which it can successfully 
interact with its environment and bring about the desired 
end, and for this reason the agent’s autonomy can be char-
acterized as self-reinforcing.
We can now consider whether the difference between 
these two kinds of autonomy should prevent us from 
analogizing the two types of agency they describe. It is 
often thought that the magnitude of that difference does 
pose an obstacle in that regard, and the argument would 
typically run as follows: Whereas the autonomy of artifi-
cial agents, being bounded by design limitations, is too 
weak to enable such agents to qualify as responsible 
members of a socially networked environment—an envi-
ronment framed by interactions governed by mutual 
expectations—the autonomy of group agents, being instead 
bounded by their organizational structure, places a much 
weaker constraint on an agent’s autonomy (especially if 
this is a group agent whose members already enjoy full 
autonomy), and for that reason group agents are not pre-
vented from qualifying as fully competent members of 
society. This I would call the minimum threshold argu-
ment—for it assumes there to be a minimum qualifying 
degree of autonomy an agent must possess in order to 
become eligible to participate in a social world—and I 
have two problems with that line of reasoning. For one 
thing, even granting that such a threshold can in fact be 
identified, what is presently limiting the autonomy of 
artificial agents is the technology we use to design and 
build them, and this is a practical impediment, not a nec-
essary or principled one, so there is no reason to believe 
that those limitations cannot one day be overcome, espe-
cially considering that the autonomy of artificial agents is 
self-reinforcing.20 And, for another thing, it seems unin-
formative to set a minimum degree of autonomy without 
considering the way in which that capacity is exercised: A 
group agent’s autonomy is exercised through the group’s 
members and through the procedures they use in coalescing 
their many voices into a single voice; an artificial agent’s 
autonomy is exercised by the agent itself on the basis of the
20 Consider in this regard the opinion expressed by the computer
scientist and inventor Ray Kurzweil (quoted in Greenemeier 2010): 
‘‘Machines will follow a path that mirrors the evolution of humans. 
Ultimately, however, self-aware, self-improving machines will evolve 
beyond humans’ ability to control or even understand them.’’
the case that the individual members’ attitudes supervene
on the group agent’s attitudes, which in turn supervene on
the individual members’ previous attitudes. This mutual
feedback between individuals and the group means that
supervenience may have an ‘‘evolving character’’ (ibid.,
77), which compounds the difficulty involved in tracking
the phenomenon.
I might comment, in this connection, that much of this
mutual feedback between the group and its members con-
sists of informal downward pressures which run from the
former to the latter, and which tend to become increasingly
pervasive and forceful as the group grows in size and
complexity, as when we get to the level of society: These
are the political and cultural forces that take shape through
the power struggles which inevitably arise within any
group of any considerable size, and they are such that the
group may wind up forcing its own identity on its mem-
bers, who may not necessarily view that identity as
something they would otherwise espouse. These pressures
raise three kinds of concerns. First, they are often ines-
capable, especially when the group within which they
emerge is one its members cannot exit at will (examples
here are the nation, the community, and even the corpo-
ration, if escaping the corporate culture and its pressures
means looking for new employment in an unreceptive job
market). Second, these pressures are persistent (as well as
pervasive) and resistant to change (one need only think
here of the laissez faire ideology which propelled the
economic and industrial revolution in post-bellum Amer-
ica, and which still acts strong even to this day, despite the
evident failures of the free-market system it is intended to
support). And third, they make it difficult to analyze the
dynamics that shape the relation between the group and the
individuals within it, for they cannot easily be quantified or
factored into any formal model.
So what happens in these situations, when facing these
three kinds of difficulties in linking the group agent’s
attitudes to those of its members, is that the group agent
acquires a degree of autonomy, an autonomy at once rel-
ative and epistemological, for on the one hand the group’s
attitudes are based on those of its members and are con-
strained by the latter (a bounded autonomy), and on the
other we cannot fully derive the group’s attitudes from the
attitudes of its members (epistemological autonomy).
Having looked at group autonomy, we can consider the
same characteristic (autonomy) in artificial agents. The
autonomy of artificial agents is precisely what enables them
to stand apart from previous ‘‘passive’’ technologies: This is
true of ‘‘sense-think-act’’ technologies, in which the range of
an agent’s action is limited to that of the input they receive.
That is different from the kind of behaviour we would rec-
ognize as properly autonomous, where an artificial agent can
select not only the means through which to achieve its ends,
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design through which it operates. These different ways of 
exercising autonomy point to different capacities, and it is 
these capacities we have to take into account in judging 
whether an agent’s autonomy makes that entity a properly 
social agent, and so an agent to which responsibility and 
personhood can be attributed.
So, having addressed two critical points of the parallel 
between group and artificial agents—arguing that neither 
their different organizational structure nor the different 
kinds of autonomy they embody are reasons for rejecting 
this parallel—I take up the implications of ascribing per-
sonhood and responsibility to artificial agents.
Implications of ascribing responsibility
and personhood to artificial agents
It would be implausible to attribute personhood and 
responsibility to any kind of agent without working out 
what such an attribution would entail, especially consid-
ering that by conferring these two attributes we fashion a 
kind of agency at once social and moral: social in the sense 
that agents so characterized must relate to and interact with 
other agents; moral in the sense that any agent operating in 
such a relational world is bound to face choices about what 
to do vis-a`-vis others, and these choices almost by defini-
tion invite moral considerations, and may even require a 
moral judgment about the best course of action in the sit-
uation at hand. As one might appreciate, a discussion so 
framed can easily expand out of proportion (covering 
anything touched by the word social or moral), and so in 
order to make it manageable I am going to restrict it to the 
question of the rights that can be claimed for artificial 
agents once it is recognized that they are endowed with 
personhood and can be held responsible.
As discussed in ‘‘Third condition of agency: responsi-
bility’’ and ‘‘Fourth condition of agency: personhood’’ 
sections, agents of any kind (individual, group, or artificial) 
are ascribed personhood and responsibility on the basis of 
their capacities, or what they can do. This means that we 
have to design rights enabling them to exercise those 
capacities. I would accordingly call these ‘‘enabling 
rights,’’ playing a role to similar to what John Rawls in his 
theory of justice as fairness called primary goods, defining 
them as ‘‘things that every rational man is presumed to 
want,’’ in which regard he asks us to ‘‘assume that the chief 
primary goods are […] rights and liberties, powers and 
opportunities, income and wealth’’ (Rawls 1971, 62).21 It is 
clear from the definition just offered that Rawls’s primary 
goods cast a wide net, because in his theory the basis on
which they can be ascribed is that of rationality (‘‘every 
rational man’’), whereas here the basis of ascription is that 
of an agent’s capacities. So, on the one hand, enabling 
rights are similar to primary goods, in that both assume the 
existence of capacities or powers of reason whose exercise 
they are intended to enable, but on the other, enabling 
rights can be much more restrictive than primary goods, 
since the former are each tailored to specific capacities, 
whereas the latter ‘‘are things which it is supposed that a 
rational man wants whatever else he wants’’ (ibid., 92), so 
their design is essentially ‘‘one size fits all,’’ considering 
that all men (or all agents, where we are concerned) are 
assumed to be rational.
Enabling rights, then, contain something of a paradox, 
because they can be both more specific than other types of 
goods or entitlements (in that they are each intended to 
support specific capacities) and more universal, in that they 
do not just apply to human beings but to any agent (human 
or otherwise) that can be thought of as rational. And that 
fact prompts two related questions connected with the two 
features just mentioned: How specific should enabling 
rights be? And how can we get them to all cohere? Or, 
more specifically, in virtue of their universal applicability, 
how can the enabling rights ascribed to nonhuman (group 
or artificial) agents be made coherent with those we rec-
ognize for human agents?
The first question cannot be addressed here in any 
exhaustive manner, because the specificity of each enabling 
right will depend on how specific the capacities are that we 
want to support on a case-by-case basis, and that judgment 
will depend on a variety of factors. Corporations, for 
example, have been recognized since the early nineteenth 
century as having the ability to sue and be sued, and that 
judgment—in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward 
(1819)—was based on a recognition of the increasingly 
important role of corporations in society, as well as on an 
interest in promoting economic growth and risk-taking in 
business.22 So we see that a lot can go into the kind of 
reasoning required to answer that first question, which, as 
the example suggests, may very well involve an assessment 
of where we are in history and what kind of society we 
want to shape. Nor am I suggesting that just because cor-
porations gained legal recognition in the nineteenth century 
as artificial persons having rights and duties, we should 
thereby take that status as justified, simply in virtue of its 
existence. To make that assumption would be tantamount 
to extracting normative conclusions from factual premises
21
Rawls would later be criticized by Habermas (1995, 114) for
assimilating rights and liberties to goods—which are more like
property, or things you own—but that is a matter that would take us 
on a long detour, so it cannot be taken up here.
22
On the historical context in which that judgment and recognition
came to be, see Friedman 2005, 136–37. For a broader discussion of
corporations as rights-holders, see Clements (2012).
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much as the latter depend on the former; or—otherwise 
stated, going back to List and Pettit’s third difficulty (‘‘Two 
kinds of autonomy’’ section)—group attitudes are shaped by 
individual attitudes as much as the latter are shaped by the 
former. This appreciation should encourage us to embrace a 
different perspective, from which instead of asking, How do 
humans stand to benefit from an ascription of rights to 
nonhuman agents? we ask, What kind of social environment 
are we shaping by making such an ascription, and is it a kind 
of environment we would like to live in?The two questions 
may very well lead to the same answer in any given case, to 
be sure, but they frame the problem differently, for on the 
one hand we set ourselves up for thinking about rights in 
terms of what benefits us as humans or as individuals, 
whereas on the other we can step back and take a broader 
view not closely focused on human welfare or on what 
benefits us in the short term.
Now, my contention is that if we design enabling rights 
on the basis of the competence approach and then view 
those rights from what I am calling the inter-relational 
viewpoint, we have a systematic way by which to address 
the question of how to construct a framework in which 
human and nonhuman rights can form a coherent whole. We 
do so by viewing ourselves not as the reason why our social 
envi-ronment exists but as an essential part of that 
environment, the idea being that what enables that 
environment to thrive enables us to thrive as well. This 
broad conception can be applied specifically to artificial 
agents in two stages: First, we recognize these agents as 
having agential capacities (or sets of capacities on which 
basis they can be counted as responsible agents qua 
persons), and second, we recognize that these agents 
interact with us within a society that sus-tains us all. And as 
List and Pettit (2011, 5) themselves point out, the reason 
why we should consider an artificial agent an agent proper is 
that if we do so ‘‘we can interact with it, criticize it, and 
make demands on it, in a manner not possible with a non-
agential system.’’ So once we start thinking that way (at this 
second stage), we have already embraced the inter-
relational stance, whose point is to show how we can work 
toward ‘‘a global society in which all persons, on the basis 
of their capacity of thought and feeling, can participate as 
equal citizens, control their own affairs and achieve their 
fullest potential, regardless of the characteristics of their 
bodies’’ (Hughes 2004, 82).
So, in summary, the argument I am making is that once 
we can recognize an artificially intelligent system as having 
capacities that make it a rational and responsible agent 
endowed with personhood, and once we recognize that an 
agent with those capacities is at the same time an inter-
active entity that is going to inhabit and shape our social 
environment, then we have the premises on which to claim 
that that agent can be recognized as having enabling rights 
corresponding to those capacities, not only because we can
(thus coming up against Hume’s is-ought problem). Rather,
as can be appreciated from the foregoing remarks, any
ascription of rights to any sort of agent requires a broad
assessment of the reasons why those rights ought to be
ascribed: These reasons are inevitably going to be norma-
tive, and they inevitably have to extend beyond a recog-
nition that the agent in question is endowed with certain
capacities; at a minimum, on the performative-relational
approach I am putting forward, we must consider how an
agent so endowed (with a set of capacities and corre-
sponding rights) is going to interact with other agents in the
broader social and political environment.
One general remark can be made, however, in
addressing the first question. It is that the broader we make
the capacities worthy of protection, and so the broader we
make the enabling rights supportive of those capacities, the
more we set the subjects of those rights (the agents rec-
ognized as rights-holders) on an equal footing, in that
agents with equal capacities are assumed to have equal
rights. So, for example, there is a risk in choosing a broad
concept of rationality as a basis of ascription, because the
broader the concept, the more inclusive it will be, and the
more it will apply to human and nonhuman agents alike.
This is the second feature of enabling rights (their universal
applicability), and it takes us to the second question, that of
the coherence or coexistence of rights.
This second question can be answered in a more sys-
tematic way than the first. To see this, we first have to set up a
contrast with the view espoused by List and Pettit (2011,
180), for whom there is a clear criterion for ascribing rights to
group agents: These rights should be recognized only insofar
as that works out to the benefit of human beings. This is what
I am calling the anthropocentric viewpoint, and it is a per-
fectly reasonable approach where group agents are con-
cerned. After all, it is we—as natural human persons—who
create or give rise to group agents, and the latter wouldn’t
exist without us, whereas the converse relation would seem
to hold: Individual agents, it would seem, can exist without
group agents, or at least they can be thought of as existing
without requiring group agency as a background condition.
In fact, no person can live in complete isolation: Everyone
has to be part of some group or community at some point in
their lives or in some capacity. If we accept that, then we can
begin to see that what appears to be a one-way relation
between individual and group agents is actually a two-way
relation, and we saw a bit of that when we considered the
third difficulty that List and Pettit (ibid., 77) point out in as a
stumbling block in any attempt to reduce a group’s attitudes
to those of its members.
If we develop that observation, we arrive at a viewpoint
I would call inter-relational, in distinction to the anthro-
pocentric viewpoint. From an inter-relational viewpoint,
we see that group agents depend on individual agents as
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engage in practical reasoning with an agent so described 
(‘‘we can interact with it, criticize it, and make demands on 
it,’’ as just noted) but also because the environment shaped 
by such agents is a networked environment whose mem-
bers are interdependent and owe their existence to it. The 
argument is not that we have to build such artificially 
intelligent systems—that trend is already afoot: It is the 
direction we are already heading in—but that once we do 
have those systems and they have the requisite agential and 
inter-relational capacities, we have a basis on which to 
make them an integral part of our social environment, 
recognizing them as having the enabling rights and corre-
sponding duties that go with those rights.
Closing remarks
An important strand of the argument I have developed for 
recognizing artificial agents as members of the social world 
we share with them has rested on an analogy between 
artificial and group agents. The debate on group agency, 
responsibility, and personhood is ongoing, and much of it 
is focused on the legal personhood of corporations [see, for 
instance, Westra (2013) and Hartmann (2010)]. That is why 
I have picked up the question of corporations as subjects of 
rights, while also referring to the historical process through 
which corporations have been recognized as legal persons. 
The point of that discussion and analogy was not that since 
corporations have been recognized as having that status, so 
should artificial agents. The point was rather to explore 
what the reasons are on which basis group agents, such as 
corporations, can, qua agents, be recognized as responsible 
members of our social and political environment, and 
whether the same reasons might apply to artificial agents. 
The account of agency I have laid out is intended to offer a 
framework within which to answer that question, and so the 
question of whether and on what basis artificial agents can 
play a role as members of the increasingly networked 
environment we are building.
So while I do argue for recognizing artificial agents as 
members of a social world, I couch that argument within an 
account of agency meant to clarify what is at stake and how 
the whole question might be approached. This is just one 
approach in a debate that has engaged philosophers, sci-
entists, theologians, lawyers, and social scientists in an 
effort to work out a range of related issues in the budding 
field of roboethics, concerned with the moral considera-
tions that we should be making in designing and using 
robots.23 Owing to the wide use of robots and artificial 
intelligence, the issues span from those of personal identity
(the enhanced self) and the interpersonal sphere (compan-
ion robots) to the socioeconomic (robot displacement of 
human workers) and national security [the use of robots in 
the military: Galliott (2015), Sparrow (2007), and Krishnan 
(2009)]. My own discussion looks out a bit further into the 
future by anticipating a world in which the technology will 
have been built that makes fully intelligent artificial agents 
already a reality, and in this scenario I ask how our relation 
to these agents should be framed.
I would like to close the discussion by pointing out two 
ways in which my line of thinking can be developed going 
forward. One way is to take a historical view in comparing 
group and artificial agents and arriving at a fuller under-
standing of both. A hint of how the historical view can come 
into the picture was offered earlier on (in ‘‘Implica-tions of 
ascribing responsibility and personhood to artificial agents’’ 
section) in connection with the question of the corporation, 
where it was briefly discussed how its role in society 
developed over time and how a variety of consid-erations 
may go into a judgment about that role and what it should 
be. I am thus suggesting that it may prove illumi-nating to 
consider not only the theory but also the devel-opment of 
agents over the long term. Where corporations are 
concerned, their history reveals that the early ones 
established under UK and US law were quite different from 
the currently operating ones. The early corporations, for 
example, could only operate on national territory and could 
not control other corporations. These conditions were 
loosened over time, and now, in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby 
(2014), closely held for-profit corporations have been found 
to have the right to assert religious convictions just as 
individuals can. From a historical perspective we can thus 
see a broad trend toward looser and looser restrictions on 
what a corporation can do under the law, or what capacities 
a corporation has and what rights ought to go along with 
those capacities. So, if corporations have seen this 
development, and the previously developed analogy 
between group (corporate) and artificial agents holds up, 
then we can begin to consider the ways in which even 
artificial agents can be envisaged to follow a similar path: 
This is something we can do by exploring the reasons that 
may be adduced in making such an argument and figuring 
out on that basis what that could mean for the legal regu-
lation of artificial intelligence.24
For an overview of the roboethics debate see, for instance, Lin
et al. (2012).
24 The important point here is the emphasis on reasons: As
previously mentioned, I am not suggesting that because history or
the law evolved as it did in regard to corporations, then we should
mimic the same line of development in dealing with artificially
intelligent agents. Rather, I am saying that the analogies that group
agents (and corporations among them) can be shown to have to
artificial agents warrant an investigation aimed at exploring whether
the justifications for one development (in the past) are sound and
might also justify another development (in the future).
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The second avenue I’d like to suggest takes its cue from its
interpretation through the inter-relational stance. It does so
by working on the idea of the social and natural envi-ronment
that comes into focus once we take that stance. It was
previously noted that the question of ascribing rights to
nonhuman agents on the basis of their capacities can be
framed in either of two ways: We can ask how we humans
stand to benefit directly from such an ascription of rights, or
we can ask how we can improve our lot through the
environment we forge through the same ascription. And it is
this latter framing of the question that I believe we should
stress. This framing connects us to the idea of environmental
ethics, envisioning a framework of rights inclusive of all
entities, a framework that cannot be com-plete without
addressing the rights of the environment as the foundation of
our own wellbeing. This very idea was pushed even further in
the 1970s by Naess (2010) in  a  conception he calls Deep
Ecology, on which nature is inherently valuable regardless of
whether it is useful for humans or animals. And this, too, is a
conception we can turn to in thinking about artificial entities,
for it shows us a way to frame the question of their agency
and of the rights ascribable to them without having to invoke
sen-tience-based categories.
Finally, I should note that the inter-relational framing of
the question of the rights ascribable to nonhuman agents is
consistent as well with the cosmopolitan vision advocated by
Martha Nussbaum in urging that we become ‘‘citizens of the
world’’ (Nussbaum 1997, 52). In making that argu-ment,
‘‘Nussbaum takes us back to the Stoics and their image of
concentric circles of affiliation, going from self and family
out to the nation and finally to the widest circle, which
embraces all of humanity’’ (Fischer 2007, 153).25 This is an 
image that comes to us by way of the Stoic philosopher
Hierocles, who thought that it was our task ‘‘to ‘draw the
circles somehow toward the center,’ moving members of
outer circles to the inner ones’’ (Nussbaum 1994, 342) in a
process where ‘‘the ultimate aim would be to treat all men as
our brothers’’ (Sandbach 1989, 34). I would therefore
suggest, in keeping with the Deep Ecology previously
mentioned, that in this process we can draw an even larger
circle extending beyond humanity so as to take in not only
the whole of humanity but also nonhuman entities like
artificial agents, and we can do so without necessarily
subscribing to a Stoic ethic, for we have independent support
for that move on the competence approach as outlined in this
article.
I believe that if we can take all this into account, we will
have a basis on which to address further questions about the
way we ought to deal with artificial agents. One
set of questions revolves around the people and the pro-
cesses to which we should entrust the decisions we make
about artificial agents, that is, (a) Who should make these
decisions—intellectuals (ethicists, philosophers, and the
like), technicians (engineers, developers, and the like),
legal professionals (judges, lawyers, jurists), policymak-
ers, or all of the above?—and (b) How should the deci-
sion-making process be organized and how many voices
should be brought into the conversation? And another set
of questions, perhaps further afield, revolves around
artificial agents themselves as full participants in our
social environment, where we can start to think about the
‘‘life’’ of artificial agents, as well as about their health,
emotions, thoughts, and the like, asking, for example,
What is it for an artificial agent to have a full life
according to its capacities and its role in our social
environment? These questions may be somewhat esoteric
at this point, but they should not be discounted, and the
approach I have outlined can offer a framework within
which to address  them.
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